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INTRODUCING THE
INDEPENDENCE STANDARDS BOARD

Richard H. Towers
ISB Technical Director

September 1 6 , 1998
OCC/FDIC/FRB Bank Accounting Seminar
Arlington, VA
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INDEPENDENCE STANDARDS BOARD

BACKGROUND, ORGANIZATION, MISSION AND GENERAL
OPERATION
Introduction (Slide 1)

Thank you for your welcome to the Washington area and, as my part
of this session, I am eager to introduce you to the activities of the
Independence Standards Board. However, as is customary, I need
to remind you that my comments today reflect solely my personal
views and not necessarily those of the Board.

My comments will be divided into two segments. The first half will be
background - matters of organization, mission, and general
operation. The second half will be about our activity to date and
where we’re headed.

The ISB is a new standard-setter, only having held its organizational
meeting on June 30, 1997, and having hired its first employee last
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October 20th. Further, the SEC’s Financial Reporting Release 50,
officially “empowering” us, only was issued on February 18th. The
Board came into being because both the SEC and the accounting
profession have long wanted a better conceptual framework for
independence rules for auditors of public companies.

(Slide 2) So why might a better conceptual framework be needed?
Since the federal securities laws were enacted in the 1930’s, the
independence rules have evolved in a piecemeal fashion, with no
clear underlying set of principles. There are now more than 200
pages of published rules, interpretations and “no-action” letters of the
SEC and its staff. These are supplemented by another 50 pages of
rules, interpretations and ethics rulings of the AICPA.

The absence of clearly articulated principles, however, means that
the rules often can not be used to analogize by those seeking
guidance for new situations. And there are many new kinds of
situations. These would include financial applications of new
technologies, the expanding scope of services offered by accounting
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firms including outsourcing, the generally shrinking relative size of
the audit practice compared to the size of the total firm, and the
prevalence of “teaming arrangements” in the economy.

In addition, the present rules generally assume that “one size fits all”
- but what is appropriate for a 10-person firm in one small city is not
necessarily appropriate for a firm of 20,000 people spread across the
country. Finally, the multitude of detailed independence rules would
eventually make it difficult to harmonize U.S. independence
requirements with those of other nations.

However - and importantly - despite its shortcomings, the current
system has worked. Investors are comfortable in relying on
published financial statements in large part because they have
confidence in the integrity and objectivity - and in the independence
- of the auditor. Therefore, before we discard what we have, we
must have confidence in that with which we are replacing it - a
framework which better protects the public interest.
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In developing its new framework and in its other activities, the
Board’s express intent is to “encourage broad public participation”
and to “stimulate constructive public dialogue.” This emphasis on
public involvement is not accidental. It is consistent with our
objectives and mission.

Objective and Mission (Slide 3)

The Board’s formal Operating Policies clearly define its objectives
and mission. We are “to establish independence standards
applicable to audits of public entities in order to serve the public
interest and to protect and promote investors’ confidence in the
securities markets.” (Slide 4) Our five specific charges are as
follows:
1. First, at inception, to adopt as our standards, the existing
guidance of the SEC. This was done at the Board’s first
meeting, and you should not expect significant change in the
short term.
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2. To develop a conceptual framework to “serve as the
foundation for the development of principles-based
independence standards.” (As an aside, one of the key
reasons we believe in the need for a principles-based
approach is to provide a better basis in the future for
analogizing to new situations and developing consistent
rules.)

3. To promulgate standards and review and ratify, as
appropriate, consensuses of the Independence Issues
Committee (known as the “IIC”) and interpretations of the
ISB staff. I’ll explain more about the operations of the IIC
and the staff in a few minutes.

4. To develop a process, including utilizing the IIC, for
identifying emerging issues for guidance and resolution.
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5. And lastly, to provide a consultative function for practitioners
and registrants who have questions about independence
standards.

The Board (Slides 5 & 6)
The Board itself is comprised of eight members - four from the public
and four from the accounting profession. The names of the members
and their affiliations are shown on the slide. William Allen, the
Chairman, was for twelve years the Chancellor of the Court of
Chancery in Delaware, that is, the head of what is generally
recognized as the most important business court in the country. In
addition, the Chief Accountant of the SEC has observer status at all
Board meetings. This group of prominent individuals has the
experience and senior status to place proper emphasis on achieving
the Board’s mission.

The Board is an independent body. While it is funded by the AICPA
SEC Practice Section, it sets its own budget and operates
autonomously.
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(Slide 7) In that respect, and in the openness of its processes, it is
very similar to the FASB. The ISB, for example, also is required to
issue exposure drafts of any planned pronouncements, and will issue
invitations to comment and hold public hearings when warranted.
The Board also expects to sponsor research for its education, and
will look for neutral analysis of subjects presented for possible Board
consideration and action.

In addition, the Board’s deliberative processes are conducted “in the
sunshine,” and you are welcome to attend its meetings or to listen by
telephone. The next meeting, by the way, is November 3 in New
York.

The ISB Staff

The ISB professional staff presently consists of me as Technical
Director, Art Siegel as Executive Director and Sue McGrath, plus
Susan Lange as administrative assistant. We will consider further
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increases when warranted by the work level. The Board and staff
addresses, telephone numbers, etc., are published on the website.

The staff’s role generally is two-fold. First, we support the Board and
the IIC in the development of standards and all their other missions.
And second, we receive and respond to inquiries from practitioners
as described under FRR - 50.

While informal inquiries may be made by telephone, and I’ve already
had one from one of your organizations, formal consultation requests
must be submitted in writing. This is to ensure that we have a
complete and agreed-upon understanding of the issues. Only written
requests and responses may be relied upon for SEC purposes and
then only by the parties involved. The SEC will not treat a response
as authoritative for others until ratified by the Board.

We have developed an inquiry form that is available on our website
and which the SEC Practice Section has sent to all its 1300 member
firms.
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To minimize overlap, the staff also is working with the AICPA and its
Professional Ethics Executive Committee, which will continue to
provide independence guidance for auditors of all entities. We also
are coordinating with NASBA, the National Association of State
Boards of Accountancy, and with international independence
standard-setters.

The staff maintains a public file of all appropriate documents,
including minutes of meetings. However, the best source of ISB
information is our website, which I’ll describe later.

The IIC

The Independence Issues Committee is comprised of eight members
from the profession, whose names and information also are
published on the website. Until the August 31 Board meeting it had
nine members, but that was reduced to reflect the
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1

PricewaterhouseCoopers merger. Art Siegel serves as the
Committee’s non-voting Chairman, and, just as at EITF, the SEC
chief accountant or his designee serves as an observer. The
Committee also operates in public, and its next meeting is October
13, in New York.

(Slide 8) The defined mission of the IIC is:

1. First, to timely identify and discuss emerging independence
issues within the framework of existing authoritative
literature.

2. To address broader interpretative issues, including those
that emerge from inquiries to the ISB staff, and
communicate its consensuses to the Board and the public.
And lastly,

3. To conduct research. Here we mean practical research, not
technical types of research performed by academics.

Although the IIC will use issue summaries and publish minutes and
consensuses, just as the EITF does, there is a key difference. Unlike
the EITF, an IIC consensus will not become “substantial authoritative
support” in the eyes of the SEC staff, unless and until it is ratified by
the ISB.

F R R -5 0 (Slide 9)

Some of you will remember that in 1973, after the FASB was formed,
the SEC issued Accounting Series Release 150 which, in effect,
delegated accounting standard-setting authority to the FASB. Under
the agreement leading to the formation of the ISB, the SEC on
February 18th issued a similar pronouncement - Financial Reporting
Release 50 — empowering us to act. The full FRR is on our website.

The Release states that the SEC intends to look to the ISB “for
leadership in establishing and improving auditor independence
regulations applicable to the auditors of the financial statements of
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Commission registrants, with the expectation that the ISB’s
conclusions will promote the interests of investors.” There’s no doubt
of the SEC orientation here.

The SEC also in the Release provided some insight into its reasoning
for participating in forming the ISB. Many of these reasons are the
same as we discussed upfront in support of developing a new
conceptual framework, and the SEC acknowledged that some
existing SEC regulations may “not provide obvious guidance” in
today’s business environment. The SEC’s bottom line is that they
agree that an “update of the Commission’s regulations may be in
order.”

The FRR makes it abundantly clear that the SEC retains its existing
authority to set independence standards. It is my personal hope,
however, that most of any differences of view which will arise with the
SEC can be resolved through the SEC’s timely oversight of, and
participation in, our ISB processes. The Commission, of course, still
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can bring enforcement actions, and state disciplinary authorities still
have their power, as do you banking regulators.

The SEC requires auditors to have “substantial authoritative support”
for their independence positions. ISB principles, standards,
interpretations and practices are recognized as having such
substantial authoritative support, but views contrary to ISB positions
are not.

The FRR also notes that when ISB activity changes existing SEC
guidance, the SEC will consider modifying or withdrawing its
conflicting guidance. In this respect, the SEC’s relationship with the
ISB differs somewhat from that with the FASB as, on a relative basis,
the SEC generally has more independence rules to be amended than
it does detailed accounting rules.

The SEC also states that it will review the ISB’s operations within five
years, especially considering changes occurring within the
profession.
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ACTIVITY TO DATE

Now, I want to move into the matters which more likely will directly
interest you - what the Board has been doing and intends to do.
Let’s start with the ISB itself.

ISB
1. The ISB has had a number of educational presentations, including
an address by Arthur Levitt, Chairman of the SEC. These have
been helpful in informing the Board - especially the public
members - of the environment, and the complexities, of auditor
independence. As an aside, it seems to me that education of the
public with regard to the Board’s new rules as they evolve is an
important ancillary objective.
Note also that the Board, through its Research Task Force, may
be considering independence research, possibly both on a focus
group basis and as to an empirical study of present and past
disclosures of non-audit services.

15

2. (Slide 10) Likely the most prominent - and controversial component of the early educational effort was the submission by
the accounting profession last October of its 300-page White
Paper entitled: “Serving the Public Interest: A New Conceptual
Framework for Auditor Independence.”

Without going into detail, the White Paper proposed use of a
conceptual framework for independence with three core principles,
development of guidelines identifying independence threats and
safeguards, and firm codes to implement the guidance in a
particular practice. While the Board decided not to expose the
White Paper for public comments, the ideas from that Paper, and
from the related SEC staff comments, undoubtedly will be
considered as the ISB deliberates its current projects.

Current ISB Projects (Slide 11)
Now let’s spend a few minutes reviewing the four active projects of
the ISB.
• Development of a Conceptual Framework for Independence
• Partners and Staff Being Employed by Audit Clients
• The Effect of Family Relationships on Independence, and
16

• Annual Independence Confirmation to Clients.

On the Road to a Conceptual Framework (Slide 12)
Presumably, the most important project on the Board’s agenda really its reason for existing - is the conceptual framework.

The

Board has recently hired Professor Henry Jaenicke of Drexel
University as a consultant project director, and has formed a broadbased project task force. This advisory task force will meet on
October 29th, and has representatives from the user community,
such as institutional investors and financial analysts, the profession,
directors, academe and corporations.

The Board’s objective is first to develop a neutral discussion
memorandum for Board consideration, although this DM may
express some tentative views on some of the issues that are integral
to the development of the conceptual framework.

After Board

consideration and approval, current plans are to expose the
discussion memorandum for public comment. With that input, the
Board would then deliberate on the contents of a conceptual
framework with the goal of issuing an exposure draft, again for public
comment. At each stage of this process the Board would consider
whether public hearings also should be held. After all of that, the
Board would then again deliberate and conclude on the contents of
the conceptual framework.
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Let me share with you some early thinking on the possible contents
of a conceptual framework.

Conceptual Framework - Issues to Consider (Slide 13)
As can be expected, there are many issues that need to be
considered. Among those identified so far are:
• The investor’s need for credible financial statements
• The objectives of independence
• The relationship of independence to objectivity and integrity. This
presumably will include a definition of independence. This is not
as easy as it sounds, and will include considering whether auditor
independence is to relate primarily to the client company or to the
information being audited.
• If there is a “reasonable investor” test, how that theoretical person
might be defined.
Factors to be Considered in Setting Standards (Slide 14)
• Also, what factors should be considered in setting independence
standards? For example:
• Can costs and benefits, if they can be measured, be
considered?
• Can threats to independence be satisfied by firm-specific
safeguards, or compensating controls, and if so, when?
• When should the appearance of impaired independence be a
factor, and how should that be determined?
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• Is materiality a consideration in reaching - or applying independence standards,

and if so,

how should

it be

measured?
• What does “mutuality of interests” mean and when might it
properly be considered a threat to independence?
Additional Issues to Consider (Slide 15)
Additional issues that may need to be considered are:
• What is the role of firm codes of conduct and cultures?
• What role, if any, in maintaining independence is properly
assigned to corporate officers and directors, including the audit
committee? This is the “corporate governance” link.
■ What role should be played by the profession’s overseers. This
would include the SEC, the Public Oversight Board, the state
boards of accountancy, the AICPA , and your organizations.

As can be seen, the conceptual framework is the most basic and
important issue facing the Board.

It also is complex and multi

faceted, and we should not expect any final conclusions for probably
two years or so. When it is completed, it will not, of itself, “answer”
independence questions, but it should logically lead to the process to
consistently determine their answers.

Employment with Audit Clients
In order to benefit from cross-development of projects and to move
ahead as timely as possible, the Board has chosen to proceed with
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several other projects on a parallel track to the development of the
conceptual framework.

Let’s first review the issues related to the

project on Partners and Staff joining audit clients. (Slide 16)

The concerns expressed when professionals leave firms to join audit
clients generally are threefold:
• First, that members of the audit team, who may have been friendly
with, or respectful of a former partner or professional when he or
she was with the firm, would be reluctant to challenge the
decisions of the former partner or professional and, as a result,
might accept a client’s proposed accounting without exercising
appropriate objectivity and skepticism.
• Second, in situations where partners or other audit team members
resign to accept positions with audit clients, questions may be
raised regarding whether the individuals exercised an appropriate
level of skepticism during the audit process prior to their
departure.
• And finally, that the departing partner or professional may be
familiar enough with the firm’s audit approach and testing strategy
so as to be able to circumvent its design.

In developing guidance, there are additional issues that need to be
considered (Slide 17):
• What effect do the previous audit responsibilities of the individual
going

to

the

client

have

20

on

independence

concerns?

Responsibilities could vary from being the engagement partner or
manager, tax partner or the concurring reviewer. Also, what if a
“nationally prominent” partner joins the audit client?
• Does it make any difference as to whether a partner leaves the
audit firm by normal retirement or withdraws prior to being eligible
for retirement? What effect would termination by the firm have?
• What types of positions at the audit client would cause
independence concerns? For example, should employment as a
Chief Information Officer cause similar concerns to those of
employment as Chief Financial Officer?

Generally, proposed solutions to this contentious issue center either
around (Slide 18):
• Establishment of safeguards or mitigating controls by the audit
firm, or
• Establishment of a mandated cooling-off period - specifying some
period of time for which independence would be considered to be
impaired - thus forcing the client to engage a new auditor if the
partner is hired in the planned role.
There is a strong polarization of views between these two choices
and, at least at first glance, there seems to be no easy way to meld
the choices into a compromise answer. Therefore, this is expected
to be a difficult issue to resolve.

Now, let’s consider the type of safeguards (Slide 19) an audit firm
could establish in a situation where a partner leaves the firm to join
21

an audit client.

Obviously, the types of procedures need to be

tailored to the position of the former partner, but the audit firm can:
• If an offer is made, immediately remove the individual from the
engagement. (This already is an AICPA independence rule.)
• If employment with a client is accepted, require an in-depth review
of prior work to assess the individual’s objectivity.
• Review the staffing

of the engagement and

subject the

subsequent audit to an in-depth review to ensure that the
remaining audit team members have not been unduly influenced
by the departing individual.

A related sub-issue (Slide 20) that may affect a firm’s independence
relates to the financial interests of the departing partner. When a
partner retires, or even before, there may be financial obligations
between the firm and the partner - for example, final profit sharing,
retirement benefits and repayment of capital.

Depending on the

particular partnership agreement, these issues can be complex and
can have serious tax implications. Depending on the new position of
the partner, the SEC, and the AICPA in certain instances, have held
that the existence of a financial interest between the departing
partner and the audit firm would impair a firm’s independence,
because of a perceived too-strong continuing relationship with the
firm. The issue clearly has to be studied to determine the types of
situations in which a continuing financial interest would create a
threat to independence.
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The Board also has created a broad-based project task force on this
topic, which will meet on October 6th, with the goal of helping to
prepare a discussion memorandum examining all viewpoints on the
issues. The DM will be exposed for public comment, and presumably
lead through the public process to the issuance of an exposure draft
and, eventually, an ISB independence standard.

Family Relationships
Let’s now discuss the family relationships issue (Slide 21).

There presently are circumstances involving an auditor’s family
relationships that are deemed to impair the auditor’s independence.
For example:
• An auditor cannot own stock in a client, and neither can the
auditor’s spouse or dependent children.
• Also, an auditor cannot audit his or her own work.

Since the

activities of an auditor’s spouse are attributed to the auditor, he or
she cannot audit financial statements prepared by his or her
spouse.

In concept, the notion of attributing direct family relationships to the
auditor makes sense - the auditor can directly or indirectly benefit
from the actions of his or her immediate family. But there are new
stresses on the operation of the existing rules. For example, (Slide
22)
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• What constitutes a family relationship?

The notion of a close

family has evolved. This includes parents, siblings, in-laws and
co-habitants. Does it continue to make sense for independence to
be impaired, for example, for actions of a spouse’s brother’s wife?
• The notion of “who is the auditor” has evolved.

Firms operate

through different organizational structures than in the past.

In

addition to audit engagement teams, often many others in different
firm divisions provide professional services to the client.

Also,

chain-of-command management, and technical and industry
leaders, may influence a particular engagement - yet most firm
personnel have no direct relationship to the engagement. Is the
entire firm “the auditor”?
• In this age of instant communications, do the previously applied
“geographic separation” rules continue to be appropriate?
• Finally, the success of women in business has increased the
number of employment-related family relationship questions.

Here are some of the complex issues that need to be considered
(Slide 23):
• Should considerations be different for those participating on an
engagement vs. firm personnel not on an engagement? For that
matter, who is considered to be “on an engagement”?
• What are “close family” relationships? Should the rules be rigid or
flexible, and where should the lines be drawn?
• Do different rules for partners, managers and all other employees
make sense?
24

• (Slide 24) Is geographic distance a mitigating control today, or is
using the line of command better?
• Are there materiality considerations that need to be considered?
• Can “firewalls” within the auditing firm be effective?
• What is the best practice? What rules are in existence in other
professions, government regulators, etc., and should the rules be
conformed?

The Board also has created a broad-based project task force on
family relationships, which will meet on October 9th. This task force
will assist in preparing alternatives for deliberation by the Board with
the objective of issuing an exposure draft for public comment.

Annual Independence Confirmation - Invitation to Comment
The last Board project I want to discuss is one that is taking a faster
track than the others and is one that you may already have seen.
This is our Invitation to Comment 98-1 (Slide 25).

In an effort to enhance awareness of independence and the issues
being faced by auditors, and to emphasize the role of auditor
independence in the process of “corporate governance,” the Board
proposed to recommend to the AICPA SECPS Executive Committee
that they require member firms to confirm their independence
annually to the audit committees or boards of their public clients and offer to meet to discuss independence issues.
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Input was sought by the ISB on a variety of matters in the Invitation
to Comment, including (Slide 26):
• If adopted in this or another fashion, will the proposal help to focus
additional attention on independence by audit committees and
their auditors?
• Is there a better mechanism to accomplish this than that proposed
by the Board?
• (Slide 27) Is there a cost of providing this independence
confirmation, and, if so, do the benefits of an increased focus on
independence outweigh that cost?
• The recommendation is being made to the SECPS Executive
Committee.

Is this

the

right

venue

-

or

should

the

recommendation be made to the Auditing Standards Board (or
possibly both)?
• (Slide 28) When would be the best time to issue the required
independence confirmation?

Our invitation to comment received 26 comment letters, and triggered
a lively discussion at the Board’s August 31st meeting. The
significant majority of the letters were supportive, but both the SEC
and the Public Oversight Board pushed strongly for the inclusion in
the auditor’s letter of more detailed - though likely not more
“technical” - independence information, such as a brief discussion of
26

major independence issues considered by the firm, rather than
simply a confirmation of independence. The idea is to increase the
likelihood of substantive independence dialogue between the auditor
and the audit committee, realizing that the SECPS does not have
authority to mandate such discussions.

Concerns were expressed to try to keep the auditor’s letter from
becoming “rote communication” or “boilerplate.” Under the original
invitation to comment proposal, the concern was about the letter
being too brief to convey significant value. And under the expanded
version just described, a concern is that the topics selected for
mention may come too much from a routine checklist, rather than
from a careful analysis of the differing independence concerns of
each engagement. Concerns also were expressed as to what
degree of responsibility for auditor independence exists with the audit
committee. The auditor must be independent under generally
accepted auditing standards and SEC rules, but the client likely also
has certain legal responsibilities regarding hiring an “independent
accountant.”
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You might wonder why the ISB doesn’t just issue its own standard on
this matter, rather than requesting the SECPS to install it as one of
its membership requirements. One reason is that, as a corporate
governance matter, the proposed auditor letter is more a matter of
“audit performance” than one where failure to issue the letter should
be considered to “impair the auditor’s independence.” Also, while a
small number of US public company auditors are not members of the
SECPS, as well as foreign firms, present thinking is those firms likely
also should be covered by a similar request to the AlCPA’s Auditing
Standards Board, or by action of the SEC.

Therefore, the present status of this project is that the ISB staff will
revise the proposal as just described, intended to send a stronger
signal to audit committees. A revised draft is expected to be
discussed at the Board’s November 3rd meeting.
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1. Let’s switch now to the Independence Issues Committee. The IIC
has two additional task forces operating beyond those supporting
the Board projects just described.
A. Materiality -The first is the materiality task force, which has for
some months been analyzing a number of the more important
aspects of materiality related to independence. The task
force’s work was just summarized, for informational purposes
only, for the Board at its August 31st meeting. These
materiality concepts may be worked into specific area projects,
and I believe will be an important focus as the Board’s work
progresses, although this depends largely on reaction to the
concept of materiality in the conceptual framework project. I do
not necessarily see a separate independence standard on the
horizon for “Materiality” per se.

B. Outsourcing - The other active IIC task force may be of more
direct interest to you - it is the one on Outsourcing. As you know,
the only independence literature so far directly on outsourcing is
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the AlCPA’s Ethics Interpretation 101-13 on “Extended Audit
Services” for internal auditing, and your related Interagency Policy
Statement. The general purpose of this task force is to build
background for the Committee and the Board as to the key types
of outsourcing being provided (including, but specifically in
addition to, internal auditing), and the issues involved in this
dynamic area. Possible related threats to independence have
been identified, as have certain safeguards and other
circumstances that may mitigate those threats. While no proposal
yet has been made, my personal speculation is that in the near
future the IIC would recommend that the ISB add to its agenda a
project on outsourcing.
2. In addition, two other areas recently have been identified for IIC
discussion, through issue summaries.
A. “Alternative Practice Structures" - The first of these is known
as the “Alternative Practice Structures” issue. As you may
have seen in the recent financial press, American Express
and several other corporations have become “consolidators”
of the non-attest operations of small to middle-sized
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accounting firms. Often the attest services remain in a
separate firm owned by the CPAs, but they lease staff,
facilities, etc. from the corporate entity. The AlCPA’s
Professional Ethics Executive Committee also is addressing
the independence aspects of these structures, primarily with
respect to nonpublic clients, and several state regulators,
including New York, have placed significant restrictions on
this type of practice. But, as to SEC registrant clients, the
IIC began discussions on September 8 to develop its own
consensus for submission to the Board and has formed a
new task force on the issue. The issue summary on this
matter is available on our website, and the IIC is expected to
continue its discussion during its October 13th meeting,
including, possible presentations from some of the
“consolidators.”
B. FAS 133 - Another matter expected to be studied by the IIC
relates to FAS 133, “Accounting for Derivative Instruments
and Hedging Activities.” The subject of this project was
intended to relate solely to the kind and level of assistance
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that auditors can provide their audit clients in valuing
derivatives as part of implementing FAS 133. However,
discussion at last week’s Committee meeting may lead to
this project expanding to address “Valuations” in some more
broad sense.

Staff of the ISB

1. (Slide 29) Website - As to the ISB staff, we have had developed
and made available an ISB website whose address is
www.cpaindependence.org.
Our site contains much information about the ISB, and should be
your primary source of reference for ISB matters. For example, it
includes:
(1) Our people and how to reach them
(2) Our Operating Policies
(3) Our meeting dates, agendas and minutes
(4) Publications and speeches (and presumably, this speech
will be entered)
(5) Staff consultations
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(6) The SEC’s FRR - 50, and
(7) Future pronouncements, exposure drafts, issue summaries,
and invitations to comment (such as our ITC-98-1)
Also, in the future, we expect to utilize a helpful electronic
communication feature called “Document Express.” After registering
for one or more of a dozen topics, you would be electronically notified
when new entries on these topics are posted to our website.

2. The staff also have been active responding to questions from
practitioners. We’ve fielded over 50 informal questions on various
topics, and we’ve entered a copy of one lengthy formal consultation
on our website.

Conclusion
In conclusion, we at the ISB know we have a major challenge ahead
of us. However, this also is a unique opportunity.

I believe I can speak for the Board in encouraging all organizations,
including yours, who have an interest in the subject of auditor
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independence to fully participate in our processes. Only in that way
can we be confident that we are best serving the public interest. And
it is clear to me that an emphasis on the public good has been, and
continues to be, in the best long term interests of the profession.

Thank you. And I’d be glad to respond to any questions you have
after the other “Auditing Issues” presentation.
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INDEPENDENCE STANDARDS

What’s wrong with the existing
standards?
In d e p e n d en ce ru le s h ave
e v o lv e d in a p ie c e m e a l

BOARD

fash ion .
R e q u irem en ts c a n n o t b e u sed
to a n a lo g iz e to n e w situ a tio n s.
R u les a s s u m e “o n e s iz e fits
all."

Rick Towers

D e ta ile d re q u ire m en ts m ak es
h a rm o n iza tio n d if f i c u l t

Technical Director

Mission of ISB
To establish independence
standards applicable to audits of
public entities in order to serve the
public interest and to protect and
promote investors' confidence in the
securities markets.

The ISB’s Specific Charges
• Adopt existing SEC guidance
• Develop conceptual framework
• Promulgate standards and ratify
interpretations
• Develop process for identifying and
resolving new issues
• Provide consultation function

William T. Allen, Chairman
Director, N Y U Center for Law and Business

John C. Bogle
Senior Chairman, The Vanguard Group

Stephen G. Butler
Chairman and CEO, KPMG Peat Marwick LLP

Board Members

Robert E. Denham
Partner, Munger, T olles & O lson LLP

Manuel H. Johnson
Co-Chairman and Senior Partner, Johnson Smick International

Philip A. Laskawy
Chairman and CEO, Ernst & Young LLP

Barry C, Melancon
President and CEO, AICPA
J a m e s J . S c h ir o
CEO, PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP

Processes
• O perate “in the sunlight”
• Issue exposure drafts
• Consider use of invitations to
comment and public hearings

• Identify new issues for Board consideration
• Interpret rules and publish consensuses
• Conduct research

The SEC’s Empowering

The Profession’s White Paper

Financial Reporting Release -

“Serving the Public Interest:
A New Conceptual Framework
for Auditor Independence”

FRR-50

Current ISB Projects
•
•
•
•

IIC Mission

Conceptual Framework
Employment with Audit Clients
Family Relationships
Annual Independence Confirmation

On the Road to a Conceptual Framework
Form Task Force with
representatives from
the user community
• institutional investors
• financial analysts
• the profession
• academe
• corporations

Conceptual Framework
Issues to Consider
• The investor’s need for credible financial
statements
• The objectives of independence
• The relationship of independence to
objectivity and integrity
• If there is a “reasonable investor” test, how
that person might be defined

Conceptual Framework
Factors to be Considered in Setting Standards

•
•
•
•

Cost/benefit analysis?
Safeguards?
Appearance?
Materiality?

• Mutuality of interests?

Conceptual Framework
Issues to Consider

• Role of firm codes of conduct and cultures?
• Role of corporate officers and directors,
including the audit committee?

Employment with Audit Clients
Concerns
• Audit team would be reluctant to challenge
former professional.
• Exercise o f skepticism during the audit,
prior to departure.
• Departing professional’s familiarity with
audit approach.

• Role o f overseers?

Employment with Audit Clients
Other Issues

Employment with Audit Clients
Proposed Solutions

• Partners vs. professional staff.
• Partner retirement vs. withdrawal vs.
termination.
• Position at client.

• Safeguards or
mitigating controls.

o ff’ period.
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Employment with Audit Clients
Sample Safeguards
• Removal of individual from engagement
until offer resolved.
• If employment with client accepted, indepth review of prior work to assess
objectivity.
• Subsequent audit subjected to in-depth
review to ensure that remaining audit team
not unduly influenced.

Family Relationships
Overall Concept
Circumstances or activities that impair the
auditor’s independence also create an
impairment when ascribed to close family
members.
• Auditor prohibited from owning client stock
- so are auditor’s dependent children.
• Auditor cannot audit his/her own work cannot audit financials prepared by spouse.

Family Relationships
Complex Issues Include:
• Degree of conflict with “on engagement”
vs. “not on engagement” relationships.
Who is “on the engagement?”
• What is “close family?” Where should the
lines be drawn?
• Do different rules for partners, managers,
and all other employees make sense?

Employment with Audit Clients
Financial Interests Balances/Benefits Owed to
Former Partner

Family Relationships
What puts stress on the existing rules?
• Notion of “close family” has evolved.
• Notion of “who is the auditor” has evolved.
• Notion of “geographic separation” has been
challenged.
• Success of women in business.

Family Relationships
Complex Issues, Continued
• Is distance a mitigating control today, or is
line of command better?
• How should materiality be applied?
• Can “firewalls” be effective?
• Should rules be conformed to other
professions, government regulators, etc.?
What is best practice?
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Annual Independence
Confirmation
ITC 98-1
Recommendation to SECPS to require
members to confirm their independence
annually to the audit committees or boards
of their public clients.

Annual Independence
Confirmation
Input sought on the following:
• Will proposal help
foster additional
attention on
independence by audit
committees and their
auditors?
• Is there a better
mechanism?

Annual Independence
Confirmation
Input sought on the following:
• Do the benefits
outweigh the costs?

Annual Independence
Confirmation
Flexibility in timing of confirmation - can be
delivered at any time during the audit:
• During the planning phase.

• Should
recommendation be
to SECPS or the
ASB, or both?

ISB Website

• As part of the SAS 61 report to the Audit
Committee.

Questions?

5

